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ABSTRACT
One of the most relevant topics in the Aristotelian moral philosophy 
for contemporary ethics is the reflection about emotional motivation and 
the link established between emotions and moral virtue. The Aristotelian 
vocabulary, that said, is unfortunately quite unclear as to that respect. In 
this paper, we will try to outline a taxonomy of the emotional lexicon in 
order to set up the semantic borders between desire and passions. Having 
established these limits, we may advance some of the most relevant features 
without which we would not be able to interpret correctly the Aristotelian 
theory of action and his conception of virtue. In order to attain this goal 
we will examine the motivational role of passions, the epistemological 
implications of desire and the occasional relation of synonymy between 
these notions.
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RESUMEN
Uno de los asuntos de la filosofía moral de Aristóteles que tiene más 
relevancia para la ética contemporánea es la reflexión sobre la motivación 
emocional, así como sobre el vínculo que se establece entre las emociones 
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y la excelencia moral. El vocabulario aristotélico, por decirlo de alguna 
manera, es desgraciadamente algo ambiguo en este punto. En este trabajo, 
trataremos de desarrollar una taxonomía del léxico emocional aristotélico 
para así poder establecer las fronteras semánticas entre deseo y pasiones. 
Una vez establecidos dichos límites, podremos proponer algunos de los 
rasgos más sobresalientes sin los cuales no sería posible interpretar correc-
tamente la teoría aristotélica de la acción ni su concepción de la excelencia. 
Para conseguir dicho objetivo, examinaremos el rol motivacional de las pa-
siones, las implicaciones epistemológicas del deseo y la relación ocasional 
de sinonimia entre estas dos nociones.
Palabras clave: Aristóteles; Ética; Pasión (πάθος); Acción; Deseo; Ex-
celencia (ἀρετή).
1. Passion in Aristotle’s Ethics
As an heir to an intellectual and cultural context that predates ours by 
twenty-five centuries, Aristotle was far from conceding a moral relevance 
to the passions in the sense we understand them today in contemporary 
philosophical debates. In spite of this fact, it is particularly significant that 
the great philosopher from Stagira provides an extensive discussion of the 
passions and makes them central in his works on ethics (in the Eudemian 
Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics) and in his Rhetoric. The importance 
of the passions is fully supported by his entirely conclusive assertion at 
the beginning of book III of the Nicomachean Ethics in which he claims 
that “excellence is concerned with passions and actions”1. That actions are 
the natural object of reflection in moral discourse is evident every time 
that Aristotle, with the term πρᾶξις, refers to a concrete type of action 
distinguished by being the consequence of contingency and deliberate 
choice (προαίρεσις). However, the singular nature of the passions prevents 
us from attributing, in an immediate manner, a moral rule2. To describe this 
1. NE 1109b30. Already at NE 1103a15, this relation is restricted to the ethical 
virtues.
2. The philosophical and moral relevance that Aristotle accords to the passions 
goes well beyond this mere textual reference, which, in itself, could be interpreted 
as an incidental assertion. In Aristotle, the passions are not simply the object of 
praise and censure–for which, to be sure, he immediately requires the condition of 
voluntariness–but rather, taking a step further, he goes on, also in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, to assert that ὄρεξις, the general appetitive structure under which the different 
forms of passion are subsumed, makes up along with perception (αἴσθησις) and the 
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implication or moral relevance in detail we must adhere, to begin with, to 
the two fundamental premises that provide the backbone of Aristotelian 
ethics and between which, in a certain manner, we witness a sort of reciprocal 
causality. On the one hand, Aristotelian moral thought exhibits a markedly 
naturalist character, that is, the premises of his moral argumentation are of a 
descriptive character and depart from what human reality is and not what it 
ought to be. In contrast to Kantian deontology (or an eidetic-transcendental 
paradigm like that of Plato), Aristotelian ethics begins with an inquiry into 
the being of man in order to develop, from this descriptive evaluation, his 
ethical theory. In fact, the teleological character of Aristotle’s categories and 
moral concepts result in this naturalism since the good of man (like that of all 
other things)3 would not be something distinct from the fulfillment of what 
man, in a certain way, already is. That is, the good of man would consist in 
the fulfillment of his best possibilities and these remain circumscribed by 
the terrain of the factually possible: We can only aspire to be what, in effect, 
we are able to be and what we are able to be is limited by what, de facto, we 
already are. 
The inclusion of the passions in moral reflection is justified precisely by 
the relation Aristotle establishes between the passions and actions given that, 
in principle, nothing could be more contrary to action than the passions. In 
fact, he insists, “neither the excellences nor the vices are passions, because 
we are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions4, but are so 
called on the ground of our excellences and our vices”5 which, along with 
intellect (νοῦς) the privileged group of elements that govern action and truth. This 
assertion seems to coincide with the recognition that Aristotle gives to the passions 
although this quote includes an additional epistemological connotation as it links the 
passions and truth. The passions, therefore, are not simply related virtue but rather 
they take on a new significance upon being described in terms of their relation to 
truth. This link, however, is not entirely novel since Plato already attributed truth 
and falsity to the passions in the Phil. [36c]. 
3. Thus he begins the Nicomachean Ethics by pointing “Every art and every 
inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and 
for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim” 
(πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι 
δοκεῖ: διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ᾽ ἐφίεται)”, NE1094a1-5. Urmson, J.O. 
calls the fallacious status of this beginning into question, condensing several earlier 
analyses, in “A fallacy of Aristotle’s about ends”. Argumentation, November 1995, 
Volume 9, Issue 4, pp. 523-530.
4. NE 1105b29-1106a2.
5. NE 1105b30.
 diego s. garrocho salcedo
24 on passion and desire: confronting an ambiguity in aristotle’s ethics
 
© Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca Azafea. Rev. filos. 16, 2014, pp. 21-37
the neutral characterization of the passions described above, would seem to 
cancel its moral relevance. However, morality is not a quality inherent in the 
pure happening of the passions but rather the latter are relevant for practical 
philosophy to the extent that they influence and determine the carrying out 
of moral action. In fact, virtue is not predicated of action in itself but rather 
of the motivational origin of conduct. Logically we encounter references 
in which Aristotle describes “virtuous actions”, but virtue is not attributed 
to mere action, but rather depends on the action being the fruit of choice, 
consciousness, and a stable mode of being. It is in this origin of praxis that 
the passions are inserted and acquire their moral dimension. Just like actions 
themselves, the pure emotional happening of a passion, for example, anger, 
may have little or no moral relevance. However, the moral quality of the 
act (i.e., being good or bad, noble or ignoble) depends precisely on what its 
cause and origin is. 
Aristotle, as we have already indicated, insists in numerous passages on 
the close link between ethical virtues and passions6. Thus he reasons that 
“for moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account 
of pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of pain that we abstain 
from noble ones”7. These ἀρεταί follow the passions (and actions), however, 
we cannot conclude from this that the virtues are strictly a form of passion8. 
In fact, the ethical virtues are neither passions nor even faculties but rather 
modes of being (ἕξεις). However, the mode of being or character (ἦθος) 
depends on the passions to the extent that they are intimately related to 
pleasure and pain, elements that would also have to determine action.
As Aristotle points out, it is for pleasure that we do the good and we 
often avoid evil to escape pain. The reasoning put forth in the Nicomachean 
Ethics is clear in this respect: “Again, if the excellences are concerned with 
actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied 
by pleasure and pain, for this reason also excellence will be concerned with 
pleasures and pains9”. Thus we can consider an action virtuous or not in 
view of the quality of the pleasures that each action entails (i.e., be they real 
6. NE 1106b25; 1107a7; cfr. 1109a20.
7.  NE 1104b10.
8. The virtues are the fruit of προαίρεσις while the passions do not require 
role of deliberate choice. The virtues do not refer us to the passions because they 
are the consequence of προαίρεσις, since the passions are not the fruit of deliberate 
choice but rather are, along with deliberation, a constitutive element of said choice 
or preference. 
9. This condition is satisfied in NE 1104b15.
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or merely apparent). Therefore Aristotle distinguishes between the mere 
carrying out of an action and the manner and causal motivation of each 
behavior. In fact the just man is the one who obtains pleasure in the exercise 
of justice and not merely the one who acts justly. 
We see, therefore, that the moral relevance that Aristotle accords to the 
passions is justified in light of two fundamental reasons. On the one hand, he 
establishes in De Anima10 that the causal determination of movement, before 
any other form of purely rational activity, is desire. That is to say, action 
is, before strict deliberation, the fruit of desire. In other words, the role of 
deliberation is morally desirable but the role of desire turns out to be absolutely 
indispensable for movement. The true principle of movement is therefore the 
desired object (τὸ ὀρεκτóν)11 and not a form of rational activity12. Thus, to act 
on the basis of a purely passional imperative would be reprehensible and, to 
a certain extent subhuman because such is the behavior of beasts13. That said, 
despite the fact that this form of action is reprehensible it remains possible. 
In this way, desire is in general described as an indispensable element given 
that without the desired object the movement of which moral action is the 
consequence would not be initiated. According to this description, we can 
imagine an irrational action, but we could never conceive of a movement 
without a desired object or, therefore, without desire. 
2. Desire and its Different Topologies
In ordinary language, as well as in the work of Aristotle, there is an 
apparent vagueness when we distinguish between the concept of passion 
and the disposition, something more generic, that we often signify with the 
term desire. Feeling a passion for something is an expression close to desiring 
something; although the term passion seems to reflect normally a higher degree 
10. DA 432b27, ff: «for mind as speculative never thinks what is practicable, it 
never says anything about an object to be avoided or pursued, while this movement is 
always in something which is avoiding or pursuing an object. No, not even when it is 
aware of such an object does it thereby enjoin pursuit or avoidance of it; e.g. the mind 
often thinks of something terrifying or pleasant without enjoining the emotion of fear».
11. Paraphrasing Hesiod, Aristotle suggests that «the beginning is thought to 
be more than half of the whole». NE 1098b7 in reference to Hesiod, Works and 
Days, 40.
12. Cf. Sorabji, Richard. “Body and Soul in Aristotle”. Philosophy. Vol. 49, n.º 
187 (Jan 1974), pp. 63-89.
13. NE 1111b7.
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of intensity. Desires are passions or are related to passions in a certain way 
given that, as we have seen, both concepts seem to have to do with pleasure 
and pain. In fact, in Greek this confusion is aggravated given that there 
are various terms that, in some way or another, signify an appetitive and 
desiderative disposition, which, in turn, seems to overlap with the meaning 
of the term πάθος. Aristotle himself is not especially clear in his use of these 
terms, although there is some textual evidence permiting us to distinguish 
between the concepts of ὄρεξις, ἐπιθυμία, θυμός and βούλησις, which are all 
terms that in certain contexts can be interpreted as synonyms of the term 
πάθος. However, they incorporate a series of nuances that we will have to 
distinguish. 
A large part of the terminological vagueness that we just addressed is due 
precisely to the manner in which the passions are related to pleasures and 
to the different descriptions that Aristotle gives of desire. In fact, at times 
there does not seem to be a difference between what πάθος is and what the 
different forms of desire are. In the relation to pleasure that is common 
to desire and the passions, ὄρεξις, for example, is described in numerous 
passages14 as an appetite for pleasure, while, in other places, this definition 
becomes somewhat redundant, once it is established that ἐπιθυμία, qua 
desire, is always an appetite for pleasure15. Apparently these definitions 
would not create any problems if it not were for the fact the Aristotle uses 
very similar descriptions for different concepts. Thus men that are guided by 
passions seem to try insistently to attain pleasures, much like what seems to 
occur, as we have just seen, with ἐπιθυμία and ὄρεξις. In addition, if βούλησις 
determines the end of our action and, as Aristotle asserts in other places, the 
incontinent man makes the pleasures the aim of his conduct, the descriptions 
of βούλησις and πάθος, as well as those of ὄρεξις and ἐπιθυμία, would seem 
to overlap. Therefore, we should figure out if ὄρεξις, ἐπιθυμία, θυμός and 
βούλησις are synonymous with the term πάθος, if they are concrete cases of 
the general form of passion or constitutive elements of different passions. 
We may begin to solve this terminological distinction on the basis of 
what Aristotle states explicitly at different moments in his work. Thus, 
for example, the ἐπιθυμία, θυμός and βούλησις are described in numerous 
passages as constitutive elements of desire. Aristotle says: “the ὄρεξις is 
sub-divided into three: ἐπιθυμία, θυμός y βούλησις”16, and this description 
14. Rhet. 1370a.17 and DA 414b5. Also Plato, Phaed., 237d.
15. EE 1223a34: ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος.
16. EE 1223a: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὄρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ 
ἐπιθυμίαν. Cf. 1225b24- 26.
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also occurs in De Anima, the Rhetoric, On the Motion of Animals, and the 
Politics17, although it is completely absent in the Nicomachean Ethics. We can 
conclude, therefore, that what is at stake are three different species of desire 
that are gathered under a common genus. However, this first division only 
resolves the relation between ὄρεξις and ἐπιθυμία, and θυμός and βούλησις, 
but nothing tells the way in which these forms of desire are related to pleasure 
and in what sense they are linked or form part of the catalog of the passions. 
Hence perhaps it is best to define each one of these concepts with a view 
toward articulating them according to the way in which they are subsumed, 
or not, under the most general definition of passion. 
Aristotle coins the term ὄρεξις to refer to a general and non-specific form of 
desire, which serves18, as we will see below, to denote one of the parts of the soul. 
Thus, the disciple of Plato calls “ὀρεκτικός” the part of the soul that, despite 
being irrational (ἄλογος), is able to listen to and obey reason “ὀρεκτικός”19. 
The case of the vegetative part of the soul is the opposite, which, because it is 
entirely irrational20, is by no means and in any grade rational. Despite this fact, 
in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle already warns us of the 
risk entailed when one lets himself be guided exclusively by ὄρεξις.
Although this form of desire is capable of cooperating with reason, there 
also exists the possibility that we obtain everything in accordance with its 
dictates, which is what occurs in the case of children and incontinent men, 
who precisely exhibit an excessive attachment to pleasure21. In addition, 
ὄρεξις acquires a singular ontological and epistemological importance since, 
17. DA 414b2, 432b5-6; 433a22-26; MA 700b19; Rhet. 1369a1-4; Pol. 13334b17-25.
18. Hudson Stephen D. states: «The term orexis, usually translated as “desire” 
has two different significations. In its narrow sense it is (roughly) coextensive with 
‘appetite’ or ‘need’ in the sense of bodily appetites (needs) that are associated with 
some natural physiological function of a living organism (DA, 414b14). In its wider 
sense it functions as a generic term for desires, under which Aristotle places three 
species: (i) wish (boulesis), (ii) passion (thumos), and (iii) appetite (epithumia) (DA, 
413a32f; 432b5-7; NE, 111b1 Of; EE, 1223a28; 1225b25; MM, 1187b37; Pol, 1334b22f)», 
«Reason and Motivation in Aristotle». Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 
1 (Mar., 1981), p. 119.
19. NE 1102b30. It is striking that in this passage Aristotle typifies ἐπιθυμία as a 
rational, or, at least, not entirely irrational, recourse. 
20. On this point, we should underline the fact that the Spanish term ‘irracional’ 
preserves the nuance that privative conveys in Greek. Thus, irrational should not 
necessarily be interpreted as anti-rational. 
21. NE 11119b.
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as a motivating principle of behavior, it is distinguished along with noûs and 
sensation as one of the three things that govern action and truth.
With the term ἐπιθυμία Aristotle usually refers to one of the species of 
behavior into which ὄρεξις is divided and which can be chiefly distinguished 
as a form of desire that is particularly committed to bodily pleasures. Thus 
he will employ the term ἐπιθυμία to signify the desire to drink in the thirsty 
man or the sexual appetite22. These connotations have traditionally led this 
form of desire to be identified as the most basic and instinctive. In fact, in 
the tripartition of the Platonic soul23, the lowest part, that which comprises 
the appetites and bodily drives, is called τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν, while in Aristotle, 
as we will see, ἐπιθυμία does not seem to be distinguished in such negative 
terms. It is true that ἐπιθυμία is an appetite for pleasure and that this form of 
desire is mainly employed by Aristotle to refer to purely bodily pleasures. 
There are, of course, concrete references that seem to support the idea that 
ἐπιθυμία is a form of negative desire. Thus, for example, Aristotle notes 
that the continent man (ἐγκρατής) is distinguished in that he knows that the 
appetites are bad (φαῦλαι) and therefore lets reason24 govern his conduct 
and a large part of the tradition following Aristotle has insisted on the 
irrational dimension of ἐπιθυμία. It is clear that the Aristotelian description 
of ἐπιθυμία identifies it as a certainly more basic form of appetite than θυμός 
or βούλησις although, however, I do not believe that we can characterize 
ἐπιθυμία as a purely irrational appetite. This appetitus concupiscibilis is 
proper, in its most excessive dimension, to beasts, children, and incontinent 
men25. However, Aristotle warns in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics that 
the only part of the soul that we can consider irrational is the vegetative. 
Thus, as he asserts, the appetitive (i.e., what concerns the appetite or ἐπιθυμία) 
and the desiderative in general are able to listen to and obey reason. This 
22. NE 1147 a 15 and EE 230 b 27.
23. Kahn, Charles H. explains the Platonic influence behind this Aristotelian 
doctrine, although in the case of the Athenian philosopher there is no common 
genus to gather the difference forms of desire. Thus the term ὄρεξις never appears in 
the Platonic dialogues. The Platonic tripartition would be specific partition of the 
soul while in the case of Aristotle it is, instead of a partition, a question of a specific 
taxonomy of the different types of desires. See “Plato’s Theory of Desire”, The 
Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 41, n.º 1 (Sept., 1987), pp. 77-103. Kahn also identifies 
the origin of the term in Democritus (fr. B 72; 284 y B 219) in “Democritus and the 
Origins of Moral Psychology”. The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 106, n.º 1 
(spring, 1985), p. 19 (11-31).
24. NE 1145b.10
25. Pol. 1254b 5; 1260a 10-15; 1254b 24; 1287a 28-31. EN L.III 2.
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description corresponds exactly to the division carried out earlier given that 
ἐπιθυμία is identified as a part of ὄρεξις, and hence ἐπιθυμία cooperates with 
reason as much as desire does, in general (ὅλως), in every one of its specific 
forms26. Therefore the risk is not that ἐπιθυμία will operate as a desiderative 
mechanism but rather that it will rule or govern (κρατεῖν) our action as a 
whole. Therefore ἐπιθυμία can also have noble actions as its object and can 
therefore be laudable. 
The term θυμός presents an even more complicated case. It is a concept 
that has been translated equally as spirit and impetus and, at times, has been 
defined as a form of anger (ὀργή)27. The term already acquires a specific 
prominence in the work of Homer and Heraclitus, for his part, referred to 
θυμός as the origin of desire. In the ascending gradation of desires, θυμός 
occupies a higher place than ἐπιθυμία, from which it is distinguished precisely 
because it can listen to and come to the aid of reason. We just showed that 
Aristotle also accorded a certain participation in reason to ἐπιθυμία but 
in the case of θυμός this relation is even more evident. Aristotle says that 
θυμός listens to reason although it does not follow the dictates of reason 
well because, much like what goes on in the case of appetite, at times it does 
not listen to what is ordered of it28. It seems therefore to be a hybrid form 
of ὄρεξις that again welcomes the possibility of attending to reason but that 
also reflects the risk of generating a specific form of incontinency. Following 
this hierarchical ordering, Aristotle specifies that it is more embarrassing to 
be incontinent with respect to ἐπιθυμία than with respect to θυμός because in 
case one or another desire becomes the governing principle of our conduct, 
the imperative of θυμός would be, in a certain way, a dictate remote from 
reason although it is perceived in a distorted light; ἐπιθυμία, however, can 
autonomously and completely govern the conduct of the incontinent man. 
In this sense, θυμός is characterized as a hybrid desire, capable of motivating 
condemnable and excessive conduct but also capable of standing out as an 
ally of reason29. 
Of the different forms of desire addressed by Aristotle, βούλησις is, 
without doubt, defined with the most imprecision and vagueness although 
paradoxically it is identified, strictly speaking, as the most relevant form. 
Generally, βούλησις has been interpreted as a form of desire that is close to 
26. NE 1102b30.
27. Rhet., 1378b4 y 1379a.
28. NE 1149a30.
29. In this sense, the Aristotelian description of θυμός is very close to the one 
that Plato offers in the Republic (cf. 440b, ff.).
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reason or even as a form of rational desire30. Thus Thomas Aquinas refers 
to it with the term appetitus intellectivus31 and today it is not uncommon 
to translate βούλησις as rational desire or rational appetite. Contravening 
the express doctrine put forth in his moral texts, in De Anima Aristotle 
situates βούλησις –in contradiction with the multiple references that we 
pointed to earlier that locate it in connection with θυμός and ἐπιθυμία– 
in the rational part of the soul, thus distinguishing it from the other 
forms of desire.32 In the interpretation that he offers in his psychological 
treatise, this form of desire would not be another component of ὄρεξις 
but rather an element completely different from θυμός and ἐπιθυμία. This 
description, along with the one we find in the Topics33, has lent support 
in the Aristotelian tradition to considering βούλησις as a purely rational 
apparatus. Current authoritative voices, such as Christine Korsgaard, have 
defended it34. Although it is true that in line with the hierarchical ordering 
of the distinct components of ὄρεξις, it would be reasonable to accord a 
greater degree of rationality to βούλησις than to other forms of desire, it 
does not seem so clear that we can characterize βούλησις (at least not in a 
conclusive manner), as a rational mechanism in the strict sense. An attentive 
examination of the textual references reveals, in effect, that the confusion is 
inherent in Aristotle’s own description of this form of desire. In addition to 
the aforementioned passages from the two ethical treatises, he also insists in 
the Politics on categorizing βούλησις as a concrete species of ὄρεξις35, which 
runs contrary, as we have just seen, to what he asserts in De Anima. Taking 
up the e. a. by Plato in Cratylus, J. P. Vernant has suggested that there exists 
a connection between the terms βούλησις and βούλευσις36, which seems to 
30. There is, moreover, a difficulty when it comes to interpreting βούλησις as 
a rational desire given that such is the definition that Aristotle gives to προαίρεσις: 
ὄρεξις διανοητική and ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς. Cf. NE 1139b4-5. In his excellent essay 
“Conceptualized and Unconceptualized Desire in Aristotle”, Thomas M. Tuozzo 
will opt for denominating βούλησις as “conceptualized desire”, arguing that the sole 
use of the adjective “rational” applied to said form of desire be ignored. Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 32, 4 (1994): 525-549. Cf. pp. 542, ff.
31. ST, Ia 2ae, Q. 22, ad. 3.
32. DA 432b5.
33. Top., 4.5.126A13.
34. “Aristotle on Function and Virtue”. History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 
3, n.º 3, July 1986, pp. 262.
35. Pol.,1334b 22-25.
36. Cf. “Myth and Tragedy.” In Essays on Aristotle´s Poetics. Ed. A. O. Rorty. 
p. 46.
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approximate the concepts of free choice and deliberation. However, as we 
will also examine in detail below, deliberation or βούλευσις is a process that 
indeed necessarily requires the work of reason (νοῦς and διάνοια) as well as 
of the work of βούλησις. But we find only one description that situates it 
above ἐπιθυμία and θυμός placing it, occasionally, in the rational part of the 
soul. It does not seem easy therefore to decide in what way βούλησις is to be 
distinguished as a rational desire or as a desire that attends to the dictates of 
reason. 
3. Similarities and Differences
Much like what would happen in the case of other terminological issues, in 
view of a cautious interpretation, we will limit ourselves to Aristotle’s moral 
texts. In fact, the well-established tendency of opting to describe βούλησις as 
“rational desire” continues, after all, to take it as a desire. Therefore, and qua 
desire, βούλησις is also capabale of generating excesses like the motivational 
element of moral action, thus establishing error-prone and unrealizable 
intentions. 
As we have seen, ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, and βούλησις share a number of features 
in common37, although the Aristotelian definition is far from complete. 
Following the usual strategy in Aristotle, it seems that at the moment of 
sketching the semantic threshold of these terms Aristotle does clearly define 
the genus of these forms of desire. However, he does not manage to establish 
precisely what is to be taken as the specific difference of these forms of desire. 
The most probable ordering, with reference to the texts, seems to order in 
hierarchical relation each one of these determinations of ὄρεξις to the extent 
that they all seem to cooperate in a certain way with reason. The status of 
ἐπιθυμία is particularly problematic given that it can operate in a way that 
is absolutely external to reason and βούλησις also seems to exhibit a hybrid 
and imprecise nature, at least, if we adhere to Aristotle’s later texts like De 
Anima. In the case of θυμός we find a certain indetermination given that, as 
we mentioned above, at times it seems to be equivalent to anger, while in 
other passages it is characterized as a natural ally of man’s rational dimension. 
If we have opted to describe in detail some of the distinctive features of 
these forms of desire, it is because these concepts, in turn, seem at times to 
reflect a close kinship to the concept of πάθος. Thus, following Aristotle’s 
37. pts. in “Plato and Aristotle on Belief, Habit, and Akrasia”. American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 7, n.º 1 (Jan, 1970), pp. 50-61. Cf. p. 54.
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very brief definition, the passions are characterized by being accompanied 
by pleasure and pain and also being in a middle term the determination 
that pertains to virtuous action. These characteristics, however, are also 
attributable to ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, and βούλησις. Each one of these forms of 
desire is related to pleasure to the extent it allows for the achievement of a 
determinate type of ἡδονή. Σπιθυμία is defined, strictly speaking, as a form of 
material or bodily desire; while βούλησις is distinguished as a form of desire 
closer to the good (be it genuine or merely apparent). Yet this difference is 
mitigated in the moment that we also recognize that we can have an appetite 
for noble things and be mistaken regarding the disposition of our will. In 
addition, βούλησις, as much as ἐπιθυμία, would desire in accordance with 
nature; the one will opt for the proper pleasures, the other for the proper 
good, but the achievement of the good would also result in a form of pleasure. 
And hence, in a certain sense, they seem to be very similar structures, as their 
common belonging to ὄρεξις suggests. However, this common belonging to 
ὄρεξις is another typical characteristic of the passions, since they refer to 
the desiderative part of the soul and not to the vegetative or to the rational 
parts. The ethical virtues indeed adhere to ἦθος, but the latter is part of the 
irrational part of the soul, which can obey and listen to reason. And hence 
the passions and desires, in addition to sharing a relation to pleasure and 
pain, have in common, at the least, the fact that they are located in the soul. 
Concerning the description that Aristotle introduces in his moral texts, 
the passions and the distinct forms of desire seem to have terribly porous 
boundaries. This conceptual overlapping is emphatically evident in the case 
of ἐπιθυμία given that this form of desire is also included as a specific passion 
in the list of the passions that Aristotle puts forth in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
the Eudemian Ethics, and the Rhetoric. In addition, incontinence (ἀκρασία), 
a blameworthy attitude with respect to the passions, is predicated as 
particularly persistent of those who harbor an excess of this specific form of 
desire. At the same time, ἐπιθυμία seems to be defined as a form of desire but 
also as a form of passion. Amelie O. Rorty tries to surmount this difficulty 
by defending a special rule for ἐπιθυμία38 and goes on to assert (while 
confronting what is literally said in the text) that there are reasons not to take 
ἐπιθυμία as a form of passion. One of her arguments consists in linking the 
passions with ψυχή in order to establish a specific relation between ἐπιθυμία 
and the body. In this way, the desire for pleasure would be rooted exclusively 
in our somatic dimension while the passions, by definition, were identified 
38. Rorty, A.O. Op. cit., pp. 220, ff.
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as occurring within the soul (along with ἕξις and δύναμις)39. I believe that 
this argument turns out to be insufficient to justify the exclusion of ἐπιθυμία 
from the catalog of passions, since the passions, although they occur, as we 
have pointed out, within the soul, are also characterized as having a manifest 
corporal implication (as Aristotle says in De Anima)40. The attempt to 
exclude ἐπιθυμία from the catalog of the passions, does not seem convincing 
also because, acording to Rorty, ἐπιθυμία does not require for its appearance 
the intervention of one or the other sensation. As we have stated, the relation 
to pleasure and pain is the distinctive quality of the passions. Again, as precise 
as this assessment may be, we indicated that, in Aristotle as much as in Plato, 
pleasure does not have to be identified exclusively with the body but rather 
with all forms of activity (ἐνέργεια) among which the activities of the soul, in 
an especially relevant manner, would have to be considered. For this reason, 
I believe we can take ἐπιθυμία as a specific form of passion that overlaps, at 
least in one sense, with the extension of the meaning of passion and desire in 
Aristotle. 
We find a similar, yet more complex, case refering to θυμός, that is, a type 
of desire that has been interpreted in Greek culture as a paradigm for πάθος. 
Also, in Aristotle θυμός  closely approximates the definition of anger (ὀργή)41. 
In fact, θυμός not only resembles anger but is also described as a characteristic 
close to virility or bravery (ἀνδρεία), which, however, is a form of virtue 
that we can also identify as a passion (this is how Aristotle denominates the 
passions in the Eudemian Ethics, where he lists different passions in terms of 
excess, defect, or balance, while identifying virtue as a middle term)42. Thus, 
the brave man stands out also for being θυμοειδής, that is, for harboring θυμός 
as a form of desire that contributes in carrying out an action in conformity 
with virtue43. In the Eudemian Ethics, restricting this form of bravery to 
barbarian warriors, Aristotle manages to point out that θυμός, in addition 
to collaborating with bravery, is capable of generating some type of pleasure 
(an argument that runs parallel to the one he puts forth with respect to ὀργή 
in the Rhetoric). However, in the Politics44, θυμός is distinguished not as a 
39. NE 1105b20.
40. DA 402b5-10.
41. Cf. Rhet. 1379a5 where he inserts, in the context of describing anger, some 
verses from the Iliad in which reference is made to θυμός.
42. EE 1221a. Thus, δύναμις is distinguished as a form of virtue to the extent 
that it is a stable disposition to act in accordance with this passion.
43. NE 1116b26.
44. Pol., 1327b30-40.
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passion, but rather as a condition for affect. That is, it is no longer a concrete 
affection, but a capacity or faculty for accommodating different passions. This 
argument is endorsed by Barbara Koziak, who, in line with Eugene Garver, 
asserts that θυμός is the capacity –δύναμις– that allows us to accommodate 
anger, pain, and piety as well as the rest of the passions45, thereby extending 
its definition beyond the particular passions and situating it as a condition or 
general definition of a form of affection. 
In the case of βούλησις46, there is less evidence to consider it as a particular 
form of passion, although it is hard to doubt that, with more or less 
participation on the part of reason, there are common characteristics that 
make it reasonable to link the passional dispositions with this form of desire. 
Thus, placed under the common genus of ὄρεξις, this specific form of desire 
is included in the same place as the various passions: the desiderative part 
of the soul. Another characteristic that seems to link the will to πάθος is, to 
the extent that it represents a form of desire, the fact that it would have to 
be related, in one way or another, to pleasure and pain (since it is a typical 
characteristic of human beings to desire pleasurable things). However, the 
sole and equivocal characterization that Aristotle puts forth of βούλησις has 
lead authors like Stephen Leighton to believe it is justified to distinguish 
between the passions and the will, arguing, in fact, that βούλησις cannot be 
taken to be a passion. According to Leighton47, Aristotle avoided making 
any reference to βούλησις in his various lists of the passions (see above) since 
βούλησις does not seek to attain any pleasure and hence it would its definition 
would be compatible with the one Aristotle gives to the passions. Literally, 
Leighton points outs that βούλησις does not pass the pain-pleasure test48.
Let us briefly pay attention to this argument. If ἐπιθυμία had pleasure for 
its object, βούλησις was defined in turn as having the good as its object.This 
is related, moreover, to the desiderative apparatus that sets the end of a given 
action, although it is possible to think that with this finalist characterization 
Aristotle means to refer to a télos. In a more elaborate sense, of what is at work 
in more basic mechanisms like ἐπιθυμία, given that the attaining of a specific 
pleasure can also function as a final cause in the carrying out of an action. 
45. Zoziak, B. Retrieving Political Emotion. NYC: Cambridge U.P., 1987, p. 95 
and Graver, E. Aristotle´s Rhetoric, op. cit., p. 113.
46. Cf. Met. 1071a25.
47. Leighton, S. “Aristotle and the Emotions”. Phronesis , Vol. 27, n.º 2 ,1982: 
p. 160.
48. Loc. cit.
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However, it seems reasonable to conclude, with Nussbaum or Cooper49, that 
the specific object of βούλησις is not a form of pleasure but rather is a question 
of the good itself (however this concept may be defined). By pointing to this 
difference we do not wish to assert that βούλησις functions as an infallible 
mechanism that always aspires to an authentic good –only the good man has 
as the object of his will the authentic good50– but rather the object of βούλησις 
and of ἐπιθυμία reflect a different level of complexity, which, however, does 
not entail a necessary negative characterization of ἐπιθυμία nor a positive 
one in the case of βούλησις. In fact, we are capable of appetitively desiring 
(in accordance with ἐπιθυμία) noble pleasures51 and also we can err in the 
object of our βούλησις. Therefore, with respect to these forms of desire, there 
is room for virtuous behaviors as well as morally blameworthy behaviors 
although βούλησις seems to stand out as an effectively more elaborate and 
complex mechanism than pure appetite since although we can conclude that 
it is entirely rationally it does participate to a large extent in reason. However, 
the criterion for demarcating the passions to which Leighton refers (the link 
to pleasure and pain) also does not seem completely conclusive. It is true that 
there is no passage in Aristotle that links βούλησις directly to pleasure and pain 
but he does recognize that the will has the good for its object. Pleasure could 
be considered a good to the extent that Aristotle warns that “to enjoy the 
things we ought and to hate the things we ought”52 and hence we could trace 
the identity between pleasure and the good to the extent that certain pleasures 
constitute a good in conforming to virtue. 
As is well known, the definition of the good in Aristotle is also not free 
from certain nuances and hence. Although we will not delve into a concrete 
and specific analysis of this problem, we should stop to take a close look at his 
reasoning. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he specifically states that the bodily 
pleasures are merely accidental goods given that, in the best of cases, they 
49. Nussbaum distinguishes them in the following manner: ἐπιθυμία: desire 
of pleasure/βούλησις: desire of an end or of the good/ θυμός: an intermediate case, 
without a specific determination. The Fragility of Goodness, p. 273. This commentary 
is also taken up by Zoziak, Barbara in Retrieving Political Emotion: θυμός, Aristotle, 
and Gender, op. cit., p. 93. We find a similar interpretation in Cooper, J. Reasonand 
Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory, op. cit., p. 266, ff., 
although, in opposition to Nussbaum’s thesis, Cooper situates the beautiful and the 
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function as a way of restoring a lack or as a remedy to a need53, an assertion 
that in principle seems to support Leighton’s thesis. However, Aristotle 
specifically states that the pleasures should not necessarily be identified with 
the bodily pleasures and relying on this distinction he elaborates a complex 
theory with respect to the qualification of the pleasures54. In the following 
pages we will look in detail at this description of the different types of 
pleasures, yet, in view of discerning the relation that is established between 
the passions and βούλησις, it suffices to refer to the mode in which Aristotle 
situates the supreme Good as a form of pleasure. 
It seems obvious, and this may be the source of more than a few 
confusions, that the bodily pleasures in a certain sense have monopolized 
the very name of pleasure that everybody takes part in, and tends toward 
them most of the time55. However, Aristotle stresses that pleasure is 
necessarily a good56 and this is evidenced by the fact that humans as much 
as animals –and even God, who always enjoys a sole and simple pleasure 
(διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν)57– are naturally inclined 
toward attaining pleasure. Obviously, every nature will have to enjoy 
the pleasures that are proper to it and hence, in Aristotle’s work, we can 
find numerous references that are critical of the pursuit of certain types of 
pleasure. Therefore, the quality of pleasure is what determines its moral 
adequacy, but, to the extent that it is oriented along the lines of reason and 
the most excellent constitution of man, natural pleasure –as in the pleasure 
of theorizing in the case of man– must be recognized as the most perfect 
good. In this manner, if pleasure (in the sense that we are putting forward 
here) can be considered a good or, at least, in the most mitigated form of 
this argument, as a constitutive element of the supreme good that is the 
eudaimonia, we may reasonably conclude that it can be distinguished as a 
specific object of βούλησις. In fact, βούλησις is defined by the disposition 
of the soul which has a good for its object. At the same time, it serves 
as the end of man’s action, which again confirms the relation between 
pleasure and βούλησις, since Aristotle recognizes the teleological function 
53. NE 1154a30 y ss.
54. Here I rely on Julia Annas’ expression, who speaks of “qualified pleasure”. 
Cf. “Aristotle on Pleasure and Goodness” in Rorty, A.O. (Ed.): Essays on Aristotle’s 
Ethics. L.A.: University of California Press, 1980. p. 298.
55. NE 1153b32: ἀλλ’ εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ 
ἡδοναὶ
56. NE 1153a5: ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι.
57. NE 1154b26. Cf. 1175ª12. 
 diego s. garrocho salcedo
 on passion and desire: confronting an ambiguity in aristotle’s ethics 37
  
© Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca Azafea. Rev. filos. 16, 2014, pp. 21-37
of pleasure when he asserts that “pleasures are not processes58 (…) they are 
activities and ends”59.
4. Conclusions
After examining the different species that make up ὄρεξις, it seems that 
ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, and βούλησις share certain characteristics with Aristotle’s 
definition and treatment of the passions. The case of ἐπιθυμία seems to be the 
most obvious, given that its presence in Aristotle’s various lists of the passions 
warrants, in fact, our taking it as a paradigmatic form of πάθος. Although 
there is no explicit reference, θυμός seems to be identified with ὀργή –as we 
noted above– and it is also distinguished as a disposition that is comparable, 
or, at least, contrasting, to other forms of passion (and virtue) as in the case of 
ἀνδρεία. The references to βούλησις are less frequent and, of course, vaguer, 
but although it also forms part of ὄρεξις it exhibits a particular characteristic 
that perhaps prevents us from categorizing it as a passion. 
Thus, the power of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός in Aristotle are essential traits 
of the incontinent man (ἀκρατής), but, with respect to βούλησις, moral 
evaluation seems to no longer depend on its degree of influence, but rather 
on the adequacy of its object. In fact, the just man as well as the licentious 
one act in accordance with their will but virtue or defects in character will 
not depend on whatever the ruling part of action and decision is but rather 
on the mode in which βούλησις governs man’s actions. Therefore, although 
in certain contexts ἐπιθυμία and θυμός cannot be recognized as passions, 
their joint relation to βούλησις would seem to situate them more precisely 
as constitutive elements of the passions or as appetitive dispositions that 
corresponds, to different degrees, to the human passions. In this manner, 
pleasure and pain determine the definition of the passions but in virtue of 
the quality of these pleasures and pains and of the mode in which these 
feelings are pursued, one form of desire or another will be activated. Thus, 
in a basic passion like ἐπιθυμία the pure force of this appetite describes a 
form of passion. However, passions such as anger (ὀργὴ) or compassion 
(ἔλεος) or justice will require the intervention of more complex desiderative 
dispositions like θυμός or βούλησις. 
58. In Book X, he will go on to describe how they accompany certain activities. 
59. NE 1153a8. This thesis, defended by Aristotle, contrasts with diametrically 
opposite position that he attributes to other philosophers at 1152b.
